Allocation problems with indivisibilities when preferences are single-peaked

Carmen Herrero () and Ricardo Martinez ()
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Ricardo Martinez: Department of Economics, Universidad de Alicante & Department of Economics, Universidad Pablo de Olavide
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Ricardo Martinez and Ricardo Martinez ()

No 06.29, Working Papers from Universidad Pablo de Olavide, Department of Economics

Abstract: We consider allocation problems with indivisible goods when agents' preferences are single-peaked. In this paper we identify the family of efficient, fair and non-manipulable solutions. We refer to such a family as M-temporary satisfaction methods. Besides, we provide arguments to defend these methods as extensions to the indivisible case of the so-called uniform rule.

Keywords: Allocation problem; indivisibilities; single-peaked preferences; standard of comparison; temporary satisfaction methods. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D61 D63 D74 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 15 pages
Date: 2006-10
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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http://www.upo.es/serv/bib/wps/econ0629.pdf First version, 2006 (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Allocation problems with indivisibilities when preferences are single-peaked (2011)
Working Paper: ALLOCATION PROBLEMS WITH INDIVISIBILITIES WHEN PREFERENCES ARE SINGLE-PEAKED (2006)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pab:wpaper:06.29

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