The Rights-Egalitarian Solution for NTU Sharing Problems
Carmen Herrero () and
Antonio Villar ()
No 09.01, Working Papers from Universidad Pablo de Olavide, Department of Economics
The purpose of this paper is to extend the Rights Egalitarian solution (Herrero, Maschler & Villar, 1999) to the context of non-transferable utility sharing problems. Such an extension is not unique. Depending on the kind of properties we want to preserve we obtain two different generalizations. One is the "proportional solution", that corresponds to the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution for surplus sharing problems and the solution in Herrero (1998) for rationing problems. The other is the "Nash solution” that corresponds to the standard Nash bargaining solution for surplus sharing problems and the Nash rationing solution (Mariotti & Villar (2005) for the case of rationing problems.
Keywords: Sharing problems; rights egalitarian solution; NTU problems. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D11 D81 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 18 pages
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http://www.upo.es/serv/bib/wps/econ0901.pdf First version, 2008 (application/pdf)
Journal Article: The rights egalitarian solution for NTU sharing problems (2010)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pab:wpaper:09.01
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