On the optimal management of teams under budget constraints

Dunia López-Pintado () and Juan Moreno-Ternero
Additional contact information
Dunia López-Pintado: Department of Economics, Universidad Pablo de Olavide; CORE, Université catholique de Louvain

No 11.11, Working Papers from Universidad Pablo de Olavide, Department of Economics

Abstract: We study optimal wage schemes for teams, under the presence of budget constraints, in a model in which agents’ effort decisions are mapped into the probability of the team’s success. We show that (first-best) efficiency can only be attained with complex contracts that are vulnerable to ex post manipulations and off-equilibrium path violations of the budget constraints. Within the domain of simple (and budget-balanced) contracts, an interesting scheme, which treats equal members of the team unequally, emerges as optimal

Keywords: Team production; budget constraints; efficiency; manipulability; impartiality (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C70 D23 D78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 22 pages
Date: 2011-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-bec, nep-cta, nep-hrm and nep-mic
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.upo.es/serv/bib/wps/econ1111.pdf First version, 2011 (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pab:wpaper:11.11

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers from Universidad Pablo de Olavide, Department of Economics Carretera de Utrera km.1, 41013 Sevilla. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Publicación Digital - UPO ().