Fair Allocation of Disputed Properties
Biung-Ghi Ju () and
Juan Moreno-Ternero ()
No 15.13, Working Papers from Universidad Pablo de Olavide, Department of Economics
We model problems of allocating disputed properties as generalized exchange economies in which agents have preferences and claims over multiple goods, and the social endowment of each good may not be sufficient to satisfy all individual claims. In this context, we investigate three categories of fairness in the initial assignment of rights, in the transaction of rights, and in the end-state allocation, their implications and relations. To do so, we explore allocation rules represented by a composition of a rights-assignment rule (to assign each profile of claims individual property rights over the endowment) and Walrasian or other individually rational exchange. Using variants of fairness based on no-envy as end-state principles, we provide axiomatic characterizations of the three focal egalitarian rights-assignment rules, known in the literature on rationing problems as constrained equal awards, constrained equal losses, and proportional rules. We apply our results to problems of greenhouse gas emissions and contested water rights.
Keywords: fairness; claims; no-envy; individual rationality; egalitarianism; efficiency; Walrasian exchange (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D63 D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Working Paper: Fair allocation of disputed properties (2017)
Working Paper: Fair Allocation of Disputed Properties (2016)
Working Paper: Fair allocation of disputed properties (2014)
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