Sharing the proceeds from a hierarchical venture

Jens Hougaard (), Juan Moreno-Ternero, Mich Tvede () and Lars Peter Østerdal
Additional contact information
Mich Tvede: Newcastle University Business School, UK

No 16.14, Working Papers from Universidad Pablo de Olavide, Department of Economics

Abstract: We consider the problem of distributing the proceeds generated from a joint venture in which the participating agents are hierarchically organized. We introduce and characterize a family of allocation rules where revenue `bubbles up' in the hierarchy. The family is flexible enough to accommodate the \textit{no-transfer} rule (where no revenue bubbles up) and the \textit{full-transfer} rule (where all the revenues bubble up to the top of the hierarchy). Intermediate rules within the family are reminiscent of popular incentive mechanisms for social mobilization or multi-level marketing.

Keywords: Hierarchies; Joint ventures; Resource allocation; Geometric rules; MIT strategy. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 D63 L24 M31 M52 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 27 pages
Date: 2016
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.upo.es/serv/bib/wps/econ1614.pdf

Related works:
Journal Article: Sharing the proceeds from a hierarchical venture (2017)
Working Paper: Sharing the proceeds from a hierarchical venture (2017)
Working Paper: Sharing the proceeds from a hierarchical venture (2015)
Working Paper: Sharing the proceeds from a hierarchical venture (2015)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pab:wpaper:16.14

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers from Universidad Pablo de Olavide, Department of Economics Carretera de Utrera km.1, 41013 Sevilla. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Publicación Digital - UPO ().