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Elected Officials’ Opportunistic Behavior on Third-Party Punishment: An experimental Analysis

Natalia Jiménez () and Angel Solano-Garcia ()

No 16.15, Working Papers from Universidad Pablo de Olavide, Department of Economics

Abstract: In this paper, we analyze how the punishment behavior of a democratically elected official varies when facing an electoral process (opportunism). To this aim, we conduct an economic experiment in which officials are third party punishers in a public goods game. We consider two different scenarios which differ in the degree of cooperation within the society. We find that officials increase their punishment when they face elections in both scenarios. Contrary to candidates’ expectations, voters always vote for the least severe candidate.

Keywords: Opportunism; Punishment; Public Goods Games; Voting; Experiments. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C92 D72 H4 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 18 pages
Date: 2016
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-exp, nep-gth and nep-pol
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http://www.upo.es/serv/bib/wps/econ1615.pdf

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Working Paper: Elected Officials’ Opportunistic Behavior on Third-Party Punishment: An Experimental Analysis (2015) Downloads
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pab:wpaper:16.15

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