Elected Officials’ Opportunistic Behavior on Third-Party Punishment: An experimental Analysis
Natalia Jiménez () and
Angel Solano-Garcia ()
No 16.15, Working Papers from Universidad Pablo de Olavide, Department of Economics
In this paper, we analyze how the punishment behavior of a democratically elected official varies when facing an electoral process (opportunism). To this aim, we conduct an economic experiment in which officials are third party punishers in a public goods game. We consider two different scenarios which differ in the degree of cooperation within the society. We find that officials increase their punishment when they face elections in both scenarios. Contrary to candidates’ expectations, voters always vote for the least severe candidate.
Keywords: Opportunism; Punishment; Public Goods Games; Voting; Experiments. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C92 D72 H4 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 18 pages
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-exp, nep-gth and nep-pol
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
Working Paper: Elected Officials’ Opportunistic Behavior on Third-Party Punishment: An Experimental Analysis (2015)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pab:wpaper:16.15
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in Working Papers from Universidad Pablo de Olavide, Department of Economics Carretera de Utrera km.1, 41013 Sevilla. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Publicación Digital - UPO ().