The Enforcement of Mandatory Disclosure Rules

Matthias Dahm, Paula González and Nicolás Porteiro

No 18.09, Working Papers from Universidad Pablo de Olavide, Department of Economics

Abstract: This paper examines the incentives of a firm to invest in information about the quality of its product and to disclose its findings. If the firm conceals information, it might be detected and fined. We show that optimal monitoring is determined by a trade-off. Overall, stricter enforcement reduces the incentives for selective reporting but crowds out information search. Our model implies that there are situations in which the relationship between the two monitoring instruments might be complementary. We also show that the welfare effects of mandatory disclosure depend on how it is enforced and that imperfect enforcement (in which some information remains concealed) might be optimal. In particular, the optimal fine might be smaller than the largest possible fine, even though the latter requires lower resource costs for inspections.

Keywords: strategic information transmission; scepticism; confidence effect; monitoring; penalty; fine; sanction; detection probability (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 L15 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 30 pages
Date: 2018-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mic and nep-reg
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.upo.es/serv/bib/wps/econ1809.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: The enforcement of mandatory disclosure rules (2018)
Working Paper: The Enforcement of Mandatory Disclosure Rules (2016)
Working Paper: The Enforcement of Mandatory Disclosure Rules (2016)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pab:wpaper:18.09

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers from Universidad Pablo de Olavide, Department of Economics Carretera de Utrera km.1, 41013 Sevilla. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Publicación Digital - UPO (publicaciones@upo.es).