Penalty-Point System, Deterrence and Road Safety: An Empirical Approach

Yolanda F. Rebollo-Sanz, Jesús Rodríguez-López () and Núria Rodriguez-Planas

No 18.14, Working Papers from Universidad Pablo de Olavide, Department of Economics

Abstract: Using a quasi-experimental approach, we study the causal effect of introducing a penalty-point system (PPS) on drivers, accidents, injuries and fatalities. We find that the PPS decreased the number of traffic offenders by 13.8%. In addition, the deterrence effect was directly related to the size of the point loss. The PPS reform also curbed PPS-related accidents, injuries and fatalities by 14,2%, 15.1% and 16.1%, respectively. These findings are robust to a battery of tests, including a placebo test with a fictitious reform date. Crucially, the timing of the PPS implementation had no effect on road incidents unrelated to PPS regulations.

Keywords: Road safety; law enforcement; driving license; and discontinuity-based model. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: K32 K41 R41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 43 pages
Date: 2018-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-law, nep-tre and nep-ure
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pab:wpaper:18.14

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