A strategic justification of the Talmud rule based on lower and upper bounds

Juan Moreno-Ternero, Min-Hung Tsay () and Chun-Hsien Yeh ()
Additional contact information
Min-Hung Tsay: Department of Economics, National Chung Cheng University
Chun-Hsien Yeh: Institute of Economics, Academia Sinica; Chung-Hua Institute for Economic Research

No 20.02, Working Papers from Universidad Pablo de Olavide, Department of Economics

Abstract: We follow the Nash program to provide a new strategic justification for the Talmud rule to solve bankruptcy problems. The design of our game is based on a focal characterization of the rule, obtained when combining consistency with two properties guaranteeing meaningful lower and upper bounds to all creditors.

Keywords: Nash program; strategic justification; consistency; lower bounds; upper bounds; Talmud rule (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 C72 D63 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 24 pages
Date: 2020-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.upo.es/serv/bib/wps/econ2002.pdf

Related works:
Journal Article: A strategic justification of the Talmud rule based on lower and upper bounds (2020)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pab:wpaper:20.02

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers from Universidad Pablo de Olavide, Department of Economics Carretera de Utrera km.1, 41013 Sevilla. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Publicación Digital - UPO ().