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Strategic justifications of the TAL-family of rules for bankruptcy problems

Juan Moreno-Ternero, Min-Hung Tsay () and Chun-Hsien Yeh ()
Additional contact information
Min-Hung Tsay: Department of Economics, National Chung Cheng University
Chun-Hsien Yeh: Institute of Economics, Academia Sinica; Chung-Hua Institute for Economic Research

No 21.02, Working Papers from Universidad Pablo de Olavide, Department of Economics

Abstract: We follow the Nash program to provide a new strategic justification for the TAL-family of rules for bankruptcy problems. The design of our game is inspired by an axiomatization of the TAL-family of rules exploiting the properties of consistency together with certain degrees of lower and upper bounds to all creditors. Bilateral negotiations of our game follow the spirit of those bounds. By means of consistency, we then extend the bilateral negotiations to an arbitrary number of creditors.

Keywords: Nash program; bankruptcy problems; strategic justification; consistency; TAL-family of rules (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 C72 D63 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 21 pages
Date: 2021
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-ore
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pab:wpaper:21.02

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