Losing Office, Switching Sides: Evidence from Spanish Municipal Elections

Paula González (), Francesca Passarelli () and Yolanda Rebollo-Sanz ()
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Paula González: Universidad Pablo de Olavide
Francesca Passarelli: Universidad de Oviedo
Yolanda Rebollo-Sanz: Universidad Pablo de Olavide

No 26.03, Working Papers from Universidad Pablo de Olavide, Department of Economics

Abstract: Using data on nearly 190,000 candidates across five Spanish municipal elections (2003–2019), we estimate the causal effect of electoral defeat on party switching. We combine a high-dimensional fixed effects panel model with a regression discontinuity design exploiting the quasi-random assignment of council seats under Spain’s closed-list D’Hondt system. Both approaches yield consistent evidence that not securing a council seat is associated with a higher probability of changing party affiliation by 2.1 to 2.3 percentage points—a 13.5% to 14.5% relative increase. Additionally, regression estimates show that party switching is more strongly linked to better future electoral outcomes among non-elected switchers than among candidates who switch while holding a seat. Our results support the theory that politicians are primarily motivated by office-seeking ambitions and highlight the strategic nature of party switching in local politics.

Keywords: party switching; party labels; political defectors; closed-list systems; politicians; office-seeking ambition; Spain; municipal elections; local randomization; regression discontinuity. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C21 D72 H11 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 57 pages
Date: 2026
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm and nep-eur
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