Privatization effects on corporate governance, strategy and compensation systems

Gloria Cuevas-Rodriguez (), Jaime Guerrero-Villegas () and Ramón Valle-Cabrera ()
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Gloria Cuevas-Rodriguez: Department of Business Administration, Universidad Pablo de Olavide
Jaime Guerrero-Villegas: Department of Business Administration, Universidad Pablo de Olavide
Ramón Valle-Cabrera: Department of Business Administration, Universidad Pablo de Olavide

No 14.03, Working Papers from Universidad Pablo de Olavide, Department of Business Organization and Marketing (former Department of Business Administration)

Abstract: Whereas research in privatization generally adopts a macroeconomic or political perspective, organizational and managerial implications are current aspects in need of further examination. This study analyzes how firms’ corporate governance and strategy relate to the use of management compensation systems after privatization. A multiple-case study in five Spanish companies leads to a series of contributions: first, variables that traditionally relate to greater board independence in monitoring do not suffer from variation after privatization. Second, the interests of the new firms’ ownership have an impact on firm strategy after privatization. Finally, compensation system design clearly aligns with firm strategy after privatization.

Keywords: Corporate governance; privatization; board of directors; compensation; strategy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 35 pages
Date: 2014-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cse
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pab:wpboam:14.03

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