On the economic value of repeated interactions under adverse selection

Ottorino Chillemi (), Benedetto Gui Gui () and Lorenzo Rocco
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Ottorino Chillemi: University of Padua
Benedetto Gui Gui: University of Padua

No 7, "Marco Fanno" Working Papers from Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche "Marco Fanno"

Abstract: The paper studies, in a repeated interaction setting, how the presence of cooperative agents in a heterogeneous community organized in groups, affects group efficiency and stability. The paper extends the literature by assuming that each type can profitably mimic other types. It is shown that such enlargement of profitable options prevents group stabilization in the single group case. Stabilization can be obtained with many groups, but its driver is not the efficiency gain due to the presence of cooperative individuals. Instead stabilization is the result of free riding opportunities.

JEL-codes: D64 D71 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 29 pages
Date: 2005-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-evo, nep-mic and nep-soc
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https://economia.unipd.it/sites/economia.unipd.it/files/20050007.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: On The Economic Value of Repeated Interactions Under Adverse Selection (2006)
Working Paper: On The Economic Value of Repeated Interactions Under Adverse Selection (2006)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pad:wpaper:0007

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