Reciprocity in Teams: a Behavioral Explanation for Unpaid Overtime
Natalia Montinari ()
No 114, "Marco Fanno" Working Papers from Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche "Marco Fanno"
Relying on the relevance of other-regarding preferences in workplaces, the paper provides a behavioral explanation for the puzzle of unpaid overtime. It characterizes the optimal compensation schemes offered by the employer which induce overtime by exploiting workers’ horizontal reciprocity under both symmetric and asymmetric information about workers' action. Finally, the paper shows that reciprocity furnishes a rationale for the composition of teams of reciprocal workers when the production technology induces negative externality among the employees’ efforts.
Keywords: Overtime; Horizontal Reciprocity; Negative Reciprocity. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D03 D83 J33 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 26 pages
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-bec, nep-cbe, nep-cta, nep-lab and nep-soc
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pad:wpaper:0114
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in "Marco Fanno" Working Papers from Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche "Marco Fanno" Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Raffaele Dei Campielisi ().