Economics at your fingertips  

Stories on corruption. How media and prosecutors influence elections

Pablo Enrique Torija JimŽnez ()
Additional contact information
Pablo Enrique Torija JimŽnez: Università di Padova

Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Pablo Torija Jiménez

No 140, "Marco Fanno" Working Papers from Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche "Marco Fanno"

Abstract: I analyse whether Attorney Generals try to influence elections by adjusting the tempo of their investigations to the electoral calendar, and whether mass media have a partisan bias and hide corruption activities of their preferred parties. For doing so, I have coded the number of articles containing the word ÒcorruptionÓ of the two main Spanish newspapers, finding significant evidence of both behaviors.

Keywords: Mass media; prosecutor; political economy; corruption; newspaper; Spain. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H11 L82 P16 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 10 pages
Date: 2011-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cul and nep-pol
References: View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: Track citations by RSS feed

Downloads: (external link) (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link:

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in "Marco Fanno" Working Papers from Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche "Marco Fanno" Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Raffaele Dei Campielisi ().

Page updated 2023-09-23
Handle: RePEc:pad:wpaper:0140