Platform Liability and Innovation
Doh-Shin Jeon (),
Yassine Lefouili () and
Leonardo Madio ()
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Yassine Lefouili: Toulouse School of Economics, University of Toulouse Capitole
Leonardo Madio: Department of economics and management ”Marco Fanno”, University of Padova and CESifo
No 285, "Marco Fanno" Working Papers from Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche "Marco Fanno"
We study a platformâs incentives to delist IP-infringing products and the effects of holding the platform liable for the presence of such products on innovation and consumer welfare. For a given number of buyers, platform liability increases innovation by reducing the competitive pressure faced by innovative products. However, there can be a misalignment of interests between innovators and buyers. Furthermore, platform liability can have unintended consequences, which overturn the intended effect on innovation. Platform liability tends to increase (decrease) innovation and consumer welfare when the elasticity of participation of innovators is high (low) and that of buyers is low (high).
Keywords: platform; liability; intellectual property; innovation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: K13 K40 K42 L13 L22 L86 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 41 pages
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-ind, nep-ino, nep-law, nep-mic, nep-pay and nep-reg
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Working Paper: Platform Liability and Innovation (2023)
Working Paper: Platform Liability and Innovation (2022)
Working Paper: Platform Liability and Innovation (2021)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pad:wpaper:0285
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