Does country-targeted anti-dumping policy by the EU create trade diversion?

Andrea Lasagni

No 2000-EP02, Economics Department Working Papers from Department of Economics, Parma University (Italy)

Abstract: Global trade liberalisation negotiated within the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the World Trade Organization (WTO) has led to significant progresses in the reduction of traditional barriers to the free movement of goods, but industrialised countries have increasingly used new forms of protection, such as antidumping, to limit developing economies. access to world markets. This paper examines consequences of the European Union (EU) anti-dumping policy on imports coming from both countries subject to the investigation and countries not influenced by these protective actions. The results of a detailed analysis, using data at a disaggregated level measures adopted during the period 1982-1992, suggest that EU anti-dumping measures tend to curtail import flows in a significant way: on average, three years after application of duties, imports are reduced by more than one third. Although the restrictive effect is noticeable, the amount of imports diverted from "targeted" to "nontargeted" countries does not seem particularly elevated (in comparison with that estimated for the United States) and this could be interpreted as a signal of greater effectiveness for EU anti-dumping strategy.

Pages: 22 pages
Date: 2000
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8)

Published in Journal of World Trade, August 2000, Vol. 34 (4)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:par:dipeco:2000-ep02

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