Political cycles and international interdependence

Mario Menegatti

No 2002-EP02, Economics Department Working Papers from Department of Economics, Parma University (Italy)

Abstract: This paper studies political cycles in a setting of international interdependence. Three main results are obtained. First in this context the political cycles caused by domestic elections are usually larger than is indicated in the previous literature. Second, political cycles can be generated by foreign elections, and cycles caused by domestic and foreign elections have opposite effects. Finally, if elections are held simultaneously at home and abroad, the amplitude of the political cycle is smaller when the same coalition wins in both countries and larger when the winning coalition is different.

Keywords: Political cycles; elections; international interdependence (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E22 E60 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 15 pages
Date: 2002
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Journal Article: Political Cycles and International Interdependence (2005)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:par:dipeco:2002-ep02

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