Bribing to Circumvent Capture and Facilitate Participation in Social Programs: Evidence from Indian Villages
Raghbendra Jha (),
Hari Nagarajan () and
Kailash Pradhan ()
ASARC Working Papers from The Australian National University, Australia South Asia Research Centre
Given that the phenomenon of capture of public programs by sections the population is rampant in developing countries, households can indulge in a strategy to improve their odds of participating in public programs by bribing the suppliers of such programs. This is an important issue affecting both the supply of local public goods and the incidence of corruption. To the best of our knowledge there is no analysis of the impact of bribery on the odds of participating in a local public goods program, anywhere. Using a unique data set for rural India this paper addresses the question of whether households bribe elected officials responsible for assuring such supply to improve their access to local public goods. We find considerable evidence of such bribing. We also model the welfare effects of such bribing on groups of households as well as the impact of bribery on aggregate welfare. Several policy conclusions are advanced.
Keywords: Bribery; Program Capture; Welfare Effects; Rural India (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D31 D63 D73 O12 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-dev
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pas:asarcc:2011-13
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in ASARC Working Papers from The Australian National University, Australia South Asia Research Centre Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Raghbendra Jha ().