Transparency, Expectations Anchoring and the Inflation Target

Guido Ascari and Anna Florio

No 22, DEM Working Papers Series from University of Pavia, Department of Economics and Management

Abstract: This paper proves that a higher inflation target unanchors expectations, as feared by Fed Chairman Bernanke. It does so both asymptotically, because it shrinks the E-stability region when a central bank follows a Taylor rule, and in the transition phase, because it slows down the speed of convergence of expectations. Moreover, the higher the inflation target, the more the policy should respond to inflation and the less to output to guarantee E-stability. Hence, a policy that increases the inflation target and increase the monetary policy response to output would be "reckless". Moreover, we show that transparency is an essential component of the inflation targeting framework and it helps anchoring expectations. However, the importance of being transparent diminishes with the level of the inflation target.

Keywords: Trend Inflation; Learning; Monetary Policy; Trasparency (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E5 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 48 pages
Date: 2012-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cba, nep-mac and nep-mon
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Journal Article: Transparency, expectations anchoring and inflation target (2017)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pav:demwpp:022

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