Expectational Bottlenecks and the Emerging of New Organizational Forms

Giorgio Rampa () and Francesco Bogliacino

No 159, Quaderni di Dipartimento from University of Pavia, Department of Economics and Quantitative Methods

Abstract: In this article we discuss the dynamics of organizational change when agents have heterogeneous initial conjectures and do learn. In this framework, conjectural equilibrium is defined as a steady state of the learning process, and all the adjustment occurs in disequilibrium. We discuss the properties of the system under different “rationality” assumptions, and using well-known learning algorithms. We prove analytically that multiplicity of equilibria, and failure of good organizational routines, cannot be ruled out: better, they are fairly probable. Stability is a crucial matter: it is shown to depend on initial conjectures. Finally, learning does not necessarily select the best.

JEL-codes: C67 E01 F14 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 28 pages
Date: 2012-01
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://dem-web.unipv.it/web/docs/dipeco/quad/ps/RePEc/pav/wpaper/q159.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Expectational bottlenecks and the emerging of new organizational forms (2014)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pav:wpaper:159

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Quaderni di Dipartimento from University of Pavia, Department of Economics and Quantitative Methods Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Paolo Bonomolo ( this e-mail address is bad, please contact ).