Electricity Market Design: The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly
Peter Cramton ()
Papers of Peter Cramton from University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton
This paper examines principles of market design as applied to electricity markets. I illustrate the principles with examples of both good and bad designs. I discuss one of the main design challenges—dealing with market power. I then discuss FERC’s choice of a standard market design.
Keywords: Auctions; Electricity Auctions; Market Design (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D44 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 8 pages
Date: 2003, Revised 2002-12-07
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Published in Proceedings of the Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences, January, 2003
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pcc:pccumd:02emd
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