Auctioning Many Divisible Goods
Lawrence M. Ausubel () and
Peter Cramton ()
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Lawrence M. Ausubel: Economics Department, University of Maryland, http://www.econ.umd.edu
Papers of Peter Cramton from University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton
We study the theory and practical implementation of auctioning many divisible goods. With multiple related goods, price discovery is important not only to reduce the winner’s curse, but more importantly, to simplify the bidder’s decision problem and to facilitate the revelation of preferences in the bids. Simultaneous clock auctions are especially desirable formats for auctioning many divisible goods. We examine the properties of these auctions and discuss important practical considerations in applying them.
Keywords: Auctions; Electricity Auctions; Market Design; Clock Auctions (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D44 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 11 pages
Date: 2004, Revised 2004
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Published in Journal of the European Economic Association, 2, 480-493, April-May 2004.
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Journal Article: Auctioning Many Divisible Goods (2004)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pcc:pccumd:04jeea
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