Simultaneous Ascending Auction
Peter Cramton ()
Papers of Peter Cramton from University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton
The simultaneous ascending auction has proved to be a successful method of auctioning many related items. Simultaneous sale and ascending bids enable price discovery, which helps bidders build desirable packages of items. Although package bids are not allowed, the auction format does handle mild complementarities well. I examine the auction design and its performance in practice.
Keywords: Auctions; Ascending Auctions; Market Design (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D44 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 15 pages
Date: 2004, Revised 2004
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Published in Peter Cramton, Yoav Shoham, and Richard Steinberg, eds., Combinatorial Auctions, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, chapter 4, 2006.
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pcc:pccumd:04mit4
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