Essential Entry: Revenues in the 700 MHz Spectrum Auction

Peter Cramton

Papers of Peter Cramton from University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton

Abstract: A common misconception is that an open access provision on a sliver of the 700 MHz spectrum would reduce auction revenues. In fact, the open access, wholesale, and bidding credit provisions put forth by Frontline Wireless, will motivate new entry, enhance competition in the auction, and raise revenues.

Keywords: Auctions; spectrum auctions; market design (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 D44 L96 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 2 pages
Date: 2007, Revised 2007
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Published in Working Paper, University of Maryland, 13 July 2007

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pcc:pccumd:07entry700mhz

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