Revenues in the 700 MHz Spectrum Auction
Peter Cramton (),
Andrzej Skrzypacz and
Robert Wilson ()
Papers of Peter Cramton from University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton
There have been several comments that criticize auction rules that prevent the two major low-frequency incumbents from winning all of the newly available spectrum and incorporating it into their proprietary networks. Such rules include new-entrant set-asides, new-entrant bidding credits, and the open access plan. We disagree with these criticisms and argue that given the current market structure, such rules are likely to improve welfare and auction revenues. We are submitting this report to provide sound economic analysis of these claims.
Keywords: Auctions; spectrum auctions; market design (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D44 C78 L96 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 21 pages
Date: 2007, Revised 2007
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Published in Working Paper, University of Maryland, 27 June 2007
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pcc:pccumd:07rev700
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