Auctioning Long-term Gas Contracts in Colombia
Peter Cramton ()
Papers of Peter Cramton from University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton
This paper presents an approach to auctioning long-term gas contracts in Colombia. I propose an annual auction for long-term firm gas contracts. The auction would assign and price all firm gas contracts, with the exception of gas from the Guajira field, which is assigned administratively at a regulated price. The proposal is a partial market design in that it does not address the transportation of gas from producer to consumer.
Keywords: Auctions; gas auctions (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D44 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 15 pages
Date: 2008, Revised 2008
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Published in Working Paper, University of Maryland, 2008
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pcc:pccumd:08gm
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