Auctioning the Digital Dividend
Peter Cramton ()
Papers of Peter Cramton from University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton
I begin by describing some of the problems of the simultaneous ascending auction. Then I present the package clock auction, which retains the benefits, while addressing the weaknesses, of the simultaneous ascending auction. I emphasize two essential elements of the package clock auction: the pricing rule and the activity rule. Along the way, I summarize both experimental and field results with the package clock auction.
Keywords: Auctions; spectrum auctions; market design; package auction; clock auction; combinatorial auction (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D44 C78 L96 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 32 pages
Date: 2009, Revised 2009
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp
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Published in Jan Kramer and Stefan Seifert (eds.), Communications Regulation in the Age of Digital Convergence: Legal and Economic Perspectives, Karlsruhe, Germany: Karlsruhe Institute of Technology
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pcc:pccumd:09add
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