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Auction Design for Medicare Durable Medical Equipment

Peter Cramton ()

Papers of Peter Cramton from University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton

Abstract: An auction design for Medicare Durable Medical Equipment is presented. The design addresses the flaws in the current program. Bids are binding commitments. Each bid binds the bidder to particular performance obligations depending on the auction outcome. The bids are made credible through a rigorous qualification one month before the auction. Each bidder provides a financial guarantee in the form of a bid bond or a deposit in proportion to the bidder’s capacity. Capacity is objectively estimated based on the bidder’s supply in recent years, with the most recent year given the most weight. Each winner provides a performance guarantee in proportion to the winner’s estimated volume won. The auction establishes a market clearing price for each product in each service area. The price paid to all suppliers is the clearing price that balances supply and demand. These prices are found in a simultaneous descending clock auction, a simple price discovery process that allows both substitution across items and complementarities. Competition in the auction comes from new entry or the expansion of existing suppliers into new product categories and service areas. After the auction, the winners compete for Medicare beneficiaries by offering quality products and services. Thus, beneficiary choice is used to further strengthen incentives to provide high quality products and services.

Keywords: Medicare auctions; health care auctions; procurement auctions (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D44 I18 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com and nep-hea
Date: 2012, Revised 2012
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Published in Working Paper, University of Maryland, March 2011

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pcc:pccumd:11cadm

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