EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Early Pilots of Medicare Auctions Bring No Solace to Auction Experts

Peter Cramton ()

Papers of Peter Cramton from University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton

Abstract: Our Economists’ Voice column of October 2010 summarized the severe problems with the current and proposed Medicare auctions. The column was based on a careful reading and analysis of the auction rules. Since that time we and other auction experts have studied the Medicare auctions with theory, experiment, and the limited amount of field data that the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) has made available. This substantial body of evidence is available at www.cramton.umd.edu/papers/health-care. The evidence strongly supports our preliminary analysis that the auction program is fatally flawed and must be fixed.

Keywords: Medicare auctions; health care auctions; procurement auctions (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D44 I18 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-hea
Date: 2012, Revised 2012
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: Track citations by RSS feed

Published in The Economists’ Voice, July 2011

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.cramton.umd.edu/papers2010-2014/cramton-katzman-reply-to-hoerger.pdf Full text (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pcc:pccumd:11ckev

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Papers of Peter Cramton from University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton Economics Department, University of Maryland, College Park, MD 20742-7211.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Peter Cramton ().

 
Page updated 2020-01-07
Handle: RePEc:pcc:pccumd:11ckev