Incentive Auctions and Spectrum Policy

Peter Cramton

Papers of Peter Cramton from University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton

Abstract: My remarks are about spectrum policy, especially a much needed enhancement, incentive auctions. Incentive auctions would allow the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) to conduct two-sided auctions—auctions that simultaneously free-up encumbered spectrum and put it to its best use.

Keywords: Auctions; spectrum auctions; market design; package auction; clock auction; incentive auction (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 D44 L96 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 8 pages
Date: 2012, Revised 2012
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Published in Testimony of Peter Cramton before the United States House Committee on Energy and Commerce, 15 July 2011

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