Ratifiable Mechanisms: Learning from Disagreement
Peter Cramton () and
Papers of Peter Cramton from University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton
In a mechanism design problem, participation constraints require that all types prefer the proposed mechanism to some status quo. If equilibrium play in the status quo mechanism depends on the players' beliefs, then the inference drawn if someone objects to the proposed mechanism may alter the participation constraints. We investigate this issue by modeling the mechanism design problem as a two-stage process, consisting of a ratification stage followed by the actual play of the chosen game. We develop and illustrate a new concept, ratifiability, that takes account of inferences from a veto in a consistent way.
Keywords: Sequential Games; Mechanism Design; Private Information (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C73 C78 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 29 pages
Date: 1995, Revised 1998-06-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: Track citations by RSS feed
Published in Games and Economic Behavior, 10:2, August 1995, pages 255-283.
Downloads: (external link)
http://www.cramton.umd.edu/papers1995-1999/95geb-ratifiable-mechanisms.pdf Full text (application/pdf)
Journal Article: Ratifiable Mechanisms: Learning from Disagreement (1995)
Working Paper: Ratifiable Mechanisms: Learning from Disagreement (1990)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pcc:pccumd:95geb
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in Papers of Peter Cramton from University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton Economics Department, University of Maryland, College Park, MD 20742-7211.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Peter Cramton ().