Synergies in Wireless Telephony: Evidence from the Broadband PCS Auctions
Lawrence M. Ausubel (),
Peter Cramton (),
Randolph McAfee and
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Lawrence M. Ausubel: Economics Department, University of Maryland, http://www.econ.umd.edu
Papers of Peter Cramton from University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton
We examine bid data from the first two broadband PCS spectrum auctions for evidence of value synergies. First, we estimate a benchmark regression for the determinants of final auction prices. Then, we include variables reflecting the extent to which bidders ultimately won or already owned the adjacent wireless properties. Consistent with geographic synergies in an ascending-bid auction, prices were higher when the highest-losing bidder had adjacent licenses. The footprints of winning bidders suggest that they were often successful in realizing these synergies.
Keywords: Auctions; Multi-Object Auctions; Spectrum Auctions (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D44 L96 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1998-06-09, Revised 1998-06-09
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Published in Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, 6:3, Fall 1997, pages 497-527.
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Journal Article: Synergies in Wireless Telephony: Evidence from the Broadband PCS Auctions (1997)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pcc:pccumd:97jems
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