The FCC Spectrum Auctions: An Early Assessment
Peter Cramton ()
Papers of Peter Cramton from University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton
This paper analyzes six spectrum auctions conducted by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) from July 1994 to May 1996. These auctions were simultaneous multiple-round auctions in which collections of licenses were auctioned simultaneously. This auction form proved remarkably successful. Similar items sold for similar prices and bidders successfully formed efficient aggregations of licenses. Bidding behavior differed substantially in the auctions. The extent of bidder competition and price uncertainty played an important role in determining behavior. Bidding credits and installment payments also played a major role in several of the auctions.
Keywords: Auctions; Spectrum Auctions; Multiple-Round Auctions; Efficiency (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D44 D61 L96 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 65 pages
Date: 1997, Revised 1998-07-12
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Published in Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, 6:3, Fall 1997, pages 431-495. Reprinted in Donald L. Alexander, Telecommunications Policy, Chapter 5, Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 75-130, 1997.
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Journal Article: The FCC Spectrum Auctions: An Early Assessment (1997)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pcc:pccumd:97jemsfcc
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