EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Auction Design for Standard Offer Service

Peter Cramton (), Andrew Parece () and Robert Wilson ()

Papers of Peter Cramton from University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton

Abstract: During the transition to a competitive electricity market, when a consumer does not select an electricity provider, who provides service to the customer and at what price? An auction for this "standard offer service" is a market-based way to assign the service responsibility and to determine its price. We explore the design issues in establishing rules for such an auction.

Keywords: Auctions; Pricing; Electric Utilities (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D44 L11 L94 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 24 pages
Date: 1997-09-26, Revised 1997-09-26
Note: Working Paper
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: Track citations by RSS feed

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.cramton.umd.edu/papers1995-1999/97wp-au ... rd-offer-service.pdf Full text (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pcc:pccumd:97wpad

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Papers of Peter Cramton from University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton Economics Department, University of Maryland, College Park, MD 20742-7211.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Peter Cramton ().

 
Page updated 2020-01-18
Handle: RePEc:pcc:pccumd:97wpad