Auction Design for Standard Offer Service

Peter Cramton, Andrew Parece () and Robert Wilson ()

Papers of Peter Cramton from University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton

Abstract: During the transition to a competitive electricity market, when a consumer does not select an electricity provider, who provides service to the customer and at what price? An auction for this "standard offer service" is a market-based way to assign the service responsibility and to determine its price. We explore the design issues in establishing rules for such an auction.

Keywords: Auctions; Pricing; Electric Utilities (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D44 L11 L94 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 24 pages
Date: 1997-09-26, Revised 1997-09-26
Note: Working Paper
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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