Lobbying over Exhaustible-Resource Extraction
Achim Voß and
No 108, Working Papers CIE from Paderborn University, CIE Center for International Economics
We characterize the resource-extraction path that is chosen by a government which is influenced by a resource-supplier lobby group. The lobby group pays the government in exchange for a deviation from welfare-maximization. We show how the development of payments relates to the development of a conflict of interest between profit-maximization and welfare-maximization. Due to stock-pollution damages, the government prefers a lower long-run level of cumulative extraction than the lobby group. Moreover, the resource suppliers’ aim of maximizing profit implies that the distorted extraction may be too slow to maximize welfare, while flow-pollution damages imply that it may be too fast.
Keywords: Environmental Policy; Exhaustible Resources; Political Economy; Lobbying; Time Consistency (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 Q31 Q38 Q58 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 70 pages
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cta, nep-ene, nep-env and nep-pol
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Journal Article: Lobbying over exhaustible-resource extraction (2021)
Working Paper: Lobbying over Exhaustible-Resource Extraction (2016)
Working Paper: Lobbying over Exhaustible-Resource Extraction (2015)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pdn:ciepap:108
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