Matching Strategies of Heterogeneous Agents under Incomplete Information in a University Clearinghouse
Britta Hoyer () and
Nadja Stroh-Maraun ()
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Britta Hoyer: Paderborn University
Nadja Stroh-Maraun: Paderborn University
No 110, Working Papers CIE from Paderborn University, CIE Center for International Economics
In actual school choice applications the theoretical underpinnings of the Boston School Choice Mechanism (BM) (complete information and rationality of the agents) are often not given. We analyze the actual behavior of agents in such a matching mechanism, using data from the matching mechanism currently used in a clearinghouse at a faculty of Business Administration and Economics at a German university, where a variant of the BM is used, and supplement this data with data generated in a survey among students who participated in the clearinghouse. We find that under the current mechanism over 70% of students act strategically. Controlling for students' limited information, we find that they do act rationally in their decision to act strategically. While students thus seem to react to the incentives to act strategically under the BM, they do not seem to be able to use this to their own advantage. However, those students acting in line with their beliefs manage a significantly better personal outcome than those who do not. We also run simulations by using a variant of the deferred acceptance algorithm, adapted to our situation, to show that the use of a different algorithm may be to the students' advantage.
Keywords: Matching; Application of the Boston Mechanism; School Choice; Strategic Behavior; Incomplete Information (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 D47 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 30 pages
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-des, nep-edu and nep-gth
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pdn:ciepap:110
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