A Note on Manipulability in School Choice with Reciprocal Preferences
Claus-Jochen Haake () and
Nadja Stroh-Maraun ()
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Nadja Stroh-Maraun: Paderborn University
No 111, Working Papers CIE from Paderborn University, CIE Center for International Economics
We show that the Boston school choice mechanism (BM), the student proposing deferred acceptance algorithm (DA) and the top trading cycles algorithm (TTC) generate the same outcome when the colleges’ priorities are modified according to students’ preferences in a “first preferences first” manner. This outcome coincides with the BM outcome under original priorities. As a result, the DA and TTC mechanism that are non-manipulable under original priorities become vulnerable to strategic behavior.
Pages: 6 pages
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pdn:ciepap:111
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