Feedback Pareto weights in cooperative NTU differential games
Simon Hoof ()
Additional contact information
Simon Hoof: Paderborn University
No 112, Working Papers CIE from Paderborn University, CIE Center for International Economics
This note deals with agreeability in nontransferable utility (NTU) differential games. We introduce state feedback Pareto weights to enrich the set of efficient cooperative solutions. The framework is particularly useful if constant weights fail to support agreeability, but cooperation is desired nonetheless. The concept is applied to an adverting differential game.
Keywords: NTU differential games; variable Pareto weights; agreeability (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C02 C61 C71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-upt
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pdn:ciepap:112
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in Working Papers CIE from Paderborn University, CIE Center for International Economics Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by WP-WiWi-Info () and ().