On unification of solutions to the bargaining problem
Claus-Jochen Haake () and
Cheng-Zhong Qin ()
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Cheng-Zhong Qin: University of California
No 113, Working Papers CIE from Paderborn University, CIE Center for International Economics
We establish axioms under which a bargaining solution can be found by the maximization of the CES function and is unique up to specification of the distribution and elasticity parameters. This solution is referred to as the CES solution which includes the NASH and egalitarian solutions as special cases. Next, we consider a normalization of the CES function and establish axioms, under which a bargaining solution can be found by the maximization of the normalized CES and is unique up to the specifications of the distribution and its substitution parameters. We refer to this solution as the normalized CES solution, which includes the Nash and Kalai-Smorodinsky solutions as special cases. Our paper contributes to bargaining theory by establishing unified characterizations of existing as well as a great variety of new bargaining solutions.
Keywords: Bargaining problem; CES Function; Normalized CES Function; Nash solution; Kalai-Smorodinsky Solution; Egalitarian Solution. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 D21 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 30 pages
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-mic
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pdn:ciepap:113
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