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Nash Smoothing on the Test Bench: Ha-Essential Equilibria

Papatya Duman () and Walter Trockel
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Papatya Duman: Paderborn University

No 130, Working Papers CIE from Paderborn University, CIE Center for International Economics

Abstract: We extend the analysis of van Damme (1987, Section 7.5) of the famous smoothing demand in Nash (1953) as an argument for the singular stability of the symmetric Nash bargaining solution among all Pareto ecient equilibria of the Nash demand game. Van Damme's analysis provides a clean mathematical framework where he substantiates Nash's conjecture by two fundamental theorems in which he proves that the Nash solution is among all Nash equilibria of the Nash demand game the only one that is H{essential. We show by generalizing this analysis that for any asymmetric Nash bargaining solution a similar stability property can be established that we call H {essentiality. A special case of our result for a = 1=2 is H1/2-essentiality that coincides with van Damme's H{essentiality. Our analysis deprives the symmetric Nash solution equilibrium of Nash's demand game of its exposed position and fortifies our conviction that, in contrast to the predominant view in the related literature, the only structural di erence between the asymmetric Nash solutions and the symmetric one is that the latter one is symmetric.

Keywords: 2-person bargaining games; {symmetric Nash solution; Nash demand game; Nash smoothing of games; H {essential Nash equilibrium (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: B16 C71 C72 C78 D5 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 13 pages
Date: 2020-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-des and nep-gth
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