Non-cohesive TU-games: Efficiency and Duality
Papatya Duman () and
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Papatya Duman: Paderborn University
No 138, Working Papers CIE from Paderborn University, CIE Center for International Economics
In this article, we draw attention to some inconsistencies and conceptual chinks in the current literature on coalitional TU-games. We criticize the widespread habit of neglecting the classic problem of coalition-building and defining feasibility, efficiency, and duality for general TU-games with respect to the grand coalition. We redefine these properties using the concept of cohesiveness by versions that are meaningful for all TU-games. Based on conceptual and historical arguments we distinguish between subsets and formed coalitions and between classic TU-games and TU-game extensions. We use the Duality Theorem of Linear Optimization to motivate the use of cohesiveness. In an Appendix, we collect some results illustrating similarities and differences between our duality and the currently widely used *-duality for TU-games.
Keywords: TU-games; duality; c-Core; cohesive games; super-additivity; Pareto efficiency (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 26 pages
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pdn:ciepap:138
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