Non-induced Preferences in Matching Experiments

Sarah Kühn, Papatya Duman (), Britta Hoyer (), Thomas Streck () and Nadja Stroh-Maraun ()
Additional contact information
Papatya Duman: Bielefeld University
Britta Hoyer: University of Tübingen
Thomas Streck: Paderborn University
Nadja Stroh-Maraun: Paderborn University

No 165, Working Papers CIE from Paderborn University, CIE Center for International Economics

Abstract: Preferences are central to matching markets, yet experiments typically rely on induced preferences that may not reflect real-world decisionmaking. We examine how induced versus non-induced preferences shape behavior in matching experiments, extending Chen & Sönmez (2006). Using the most frequently used school choice mechanisms (Boston, Deferred Acceptance, and Top Trading Cycles), we supplement monetary incentives with participants’ own preferences. Our results show that preference induction systematically affects truthful reporting and comprehension of mechanisms. These findings underscore that experimental design choices matter for the validity of behavioral insights and have direct implications for policy evaluation.

Keywords: Non-induced Preferences; Experiments; Matching; School Choice (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 D47 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 36
Date: 2025-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-dcm, nep-des and nep-exp
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Related works:
Working Paper: Non-induced preferences in matching experiments (2025)
Working Paper: Non-induced Preferences in Matching Experiments (2025)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pdn:ciepap:165

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