Special Interest Politics: Contribution Schedules versus Nash Bargaining

Achim Voß and Mark Schopf

No 27, Working Papers Dissertations from Paderborn University, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics

Abstract: The article compares two models of lobby influence on policy choice: The Grossman & Helpman (1994) contribution-schedule model and a negotiation between the lobbies and the government summarized by a Nash-bargaining function. The literature uses the models interchangeably because they imply the same equilibrium policy. We derive under which conditions they lead to the same payments, equilibrium utilities, and total efficiency. They coincide under particular assumptions about bargaining power and disagreement utility.

Keywords: Nash Bargaining; Common-Agency Model; Lobbying (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 C78 D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 12
Date: 2016-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth, nep-pol and nep-upt
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Special Interest Politicsː Contribution Schedules versus Nash Bargaining (2016)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pdn:dispap:27

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