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Stability in Weighted College Admissions Problems

Britta Hoyer () and Nadja Stroh-Maraun ()
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Britta Hoyer: Paderborn University
Nadja Stroh-Maraun: Paderborn University

No 63, Working Papers Dissertations from Paderborn University, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics

Abstract: There are a number of college admissions problems in which students are heterogeneous according to the space they occupy at the college they are allocated to. To deal with this source of heterogeneity we propose a weighted college admissions problem by assigning each student a so-called weight. The existence of stable matchings is not ensured in weighted college admissions problems. To find a stable matching, if it exists, we propose a new algorithm, the deferred acceptance algorithm with gaps (DAG). It results in stable matchings if existing and cycles otherwise. Moreover, we show how to restore stability.

Keywords: Matching; School Choice; College Admissions Problems; Deferred Acceptance Algorithm; Stability; DAG; Gaps (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 D47 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 38
Date: 2020-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-des and nep-gen
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