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Network formation with NIMBY constraints

Lukas Block ()
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Lukas Block: Paderborn University

No 94, Working Papers Dissertations from Paderborn University, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics

Abstract: We study the structure of power networks in consideration of local protests against certain power lines ('not-in-my-backyard'). An application of a network formation game is used to determine whether or not such protests arise. We examine the existence of stable networks and their characteristics, when no player wants to make an alteration. Stability within this game is only reached if each player is sufficiently connected to a power source but is not linked to more players than necessary. In addition, we introduce an algorithm that creates a stable network. (abstract of the paper)

Keywords: Network formation; NIMBY; Power networks; Nash stability (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 D72 D74 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 12
Date: 2022-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-gth, nep-net and nep-soc
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