Economic Statecraft: from Negative Sanctions to Positive Sanctions
Raul Caruso ()
No 1010, Working Papers from European Centre of Peace Science, Integration and Cooperation (CESPIC), Catholic University 'Our Lady of Good Counsel'
Abstract:
This paper presents some insights on economic statecraft with a special focus on economic sanctions. Taking some evidence on negative economic sanctions as point of departure the paper is an attempt to throw light on aspects and factors which could be considered relevant while designing ‘positive’ economic sanctions. Two aspects have been highlighted as being crucial. First, a proper consideration of interest and social groups has been proven to explain the failure of comprehensive negative sanctions, the success of smart sanctions and – more interestingly – the potential success of positive sanctions. Secondly, the existence (or the lack) of some institutional arrangement between sender states also explains the failure of negative sanctions as well as the potential success of positive sanctions.
Keywords: economic sanctions; positive sanctions; negative sanctions; effectiveness; trade; interest groups (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F5 F51 H56 N40 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 17 pages
Date: 2021-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-int
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pea:wpaper:1010
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