An Extension of Fairness in Nash: A Revision

Raul Fabella

No 198513, UP School of Economics Discussion Papers from University of the Philippines School of Economics

Abstract: The Symmetry axiom which introduces a sense of fairness in the Nash axiom system for the 2-person allocation game does not apply to more general allowable utility spaces. We develop the concept of subsymmetric sets of replace the Symmetry axiom with the "Minimized Inequality Axiom" which includes the Symmetry axiom. We show that the Nash bargaining solution is robust against this generalization and by Nash own uniqueness result, still remains unique.

Date: 1985-11
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Published as UPSE Discussion Paper No. 1985-13, November 1985

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