Principal and Agent in a Lexicographic Model

Jose Encarnacion

No 198907, UP School of Economics Discussion Papers from University of the Philippines School of Economics

Abstract: This paper formulates the principal-agent problem in a lexicographic arbitration framework. Applying a previous result, the solution satisfies four conditions similar to those of Nash (1950) and is the only solution that does so. Less risk aversion in the sense of this paper implies a riskier choice, and there is a rationale for the agent's fee to be a linear function of the monetary outcome.

Date: 1989-06
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Published as UPSE Discussion Paper No. 1989-07, June 1989

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:phs:dpaper:198907

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in UP School of Economics Discussion Papers from University of the Philippines School of Economics Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by RT Campos ().