Multiple Juries and Two-Party Representative Democracy in the Condorcet Jury Framework

Raul Fabella

No 200107, UP School of Economics Discussion Papers from University of the Philippines School of Economics

Abstract: We consider decision regimes where two independent juries choose opposite majority rule winners in the same dichotomous choice problem. We highlight the role of the extent of victory on top of the numbers competence effects in evaluating the outcomes. We also analyze the judgmental competence of representative democracy in a two-party system when voter judgmental competence erodes with the size of constituency. We show when constituency division enhances the polity's judgmental competence.

Pages: 17 pages
Date: 2001-03
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Published as UPSE Discussion Paper No. 2001-07, March 2001

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:phs:dpaper:200107

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